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This article argues that Jewish merchants have historically dominated
the diamond industry because of their ability to reliably implement diamond
credit sales. Success in the industry requires enforcing executory agreements
that are beyond the reach of public courts, and Jewish diamond merchants
enforce such contracts with a reputation mechanism supported by a distinctive set of industry, family, and community institutions. An industry
arbitration system publicizes promises that are not kept. Intergenerational
legacies induce merchants to deal honestly through their very last transaction, so that their children may inherit valuable livelihoods. And ultraOrthodox Jews, for whom participation in their communities is paramount,
provide important value-added services to the industry without posing the
threat of theft and flight.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Why are America’s diamond merchants primarily Jewish? Jewish
predominance in the diamond trade spans several centuries and continents,
and activity in the modern-day industry is most concentrated in Jewish
communities populated by the ultra-Orthodox. This article argues that
community institutions within the Jewish community support diamond transactions and generate efficiencies that other economic organizations cannot
achieve. Consequently, these community institutions give Jewish merchants
comparative advantages over rivals.
The distinguishing feature of the diamond industry lies in the typical
diamond transaction: trade in diamonds invites extraordinarily lucrative
opportunities for industry players to cheat, most notably to steal another’s
diamonds. Credit sales, which are highly preferable to simultaneous exchange
due to liquidity constraints and seasonal demand, routinely put scores of
diamonds into the hands of individual diamond merchants who have not
paid for them. Although the law makes certain security mechanisms available to those who extend such credit, such as attaching a lien to the diamonds
or assigning collateral to secure the extension of credit, diamond merchants
have systematically rejected use of public courts and state-created law to
enforce contracts and police behavior. Instead, they rely on a private system
that is less costly, more reliable, and thus superior to state-based alternatives.
Diamond merchants reliably fulfill contractual obligations without the
threat of state intervention, and this reliability in turn enables these
merchants to credibly commit to fulfilling executory obligations. This ability
to enforce executory contracts that public courts cannot enforce, and thus
that potential industry rivals cannot enforce, propels the Jewish community’s
success.1

1. The important feature of executory contracts for this analysis is its arrangement of
time-inconsistent exchange. Such exchange occurs when parties A and B contract to exchange
items of value, but time elapses between the moment party A gives a good to B and the moment
B gives a good or a payment to A, i.e., there is a separation between the “quid” and the
“quo.” A paradigmatic example is the credit sale, in which the buyer receives the goods and
pays the seller at a later date. It has been argued, by none less than Judge Richard Posner,
that “the most important thing which [contract] law does is to facilitate exchanges that
are not simultaneous by preventing either party from taking advantage of the vulnerabilities
to which sequential performance may give rise.” Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal
Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir. 1986). Although it was not until the 1960s that modern
economists finally came to appreciate the critical role that reliable contract enforcement
plays in economic development, both Adam Smith ([1776] 1976) and Montesquieu ([1748]
1977) placed emphasis on legal structure as prerequisites to successful economies. Smith put
it best: “Commerce and manufacturers can seldom flourish long in any state which does not
enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure
in the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law,
and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing
the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay” (910).
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Section II begins with a fuller articulation of the historical puzzle
presented by Jewish predominance in the diamond industry, and Section III
describes with particularity the structure of the diamond trade, paying special
attention to the unique difficulties, or contracting hazards, of typical diamond
transactions. Section IV, which addresses this article’s central question, then
examines how diamond traders enforce executory agreements.2 It analyzes
the economic players in the diamond industry, many of whom are Orthodox
Jews, and explains how they are induced to cooperate with fellow diamond
merchants and, despite profound attractions to cheat, comply with their
contractual obligations. Section V briefly reviews how some similarly structured
trading networks, including but not limited to those that dominate other
diamond centers, manage contract enforcement to overcome the ineffectiveness of state-sponsored courts. Section VI offers concluding remarks and some
reflections on the future of the Jewish diamond merchant community.

II. AN HISTORICAL PUZZLE
Jewish merchants have long played an important role in the world’s
diamond industry. In the eleventh century, two Jewish brothers, living in Cairo
as prominent bankers and diamond merchants, supplied the Fatimid Caliph
Empire with precious stones. Throughout the Middle Ages, when India was the
world’s leading source of raw diamonds, Jewish communities along the Indian
Ocean trade routes—Egypt, Maghreb, and the shores of Southern Europe—
were home to diamond traders and cutters. Beginning in 1492, Sephardic Jews
escaping the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal built the world’s then-largest
diamond market in Holland and enjoyed a virtual monopoly for several centuries.
In seventeenth and eighteenth century Germany, a sizable Jewish community
in Hamburg monopolized the diamond trade to the courts of Europe. And
when eighteenth century England’s trade with India made London a lucrative
diamond trade center, a majority of the East India Company’s diamond importers
were Jewish (Grayzel 1968, 426–27; Baron et al. 1975, 158–61; Shainberg
1982, 301–11). These high-level connections in the diamond world culminated with the Jewish family-controlled De Beers syndicate, which in the
1960s managed the production and marketing of close to 100 percent of
the world’s uncut diamonds and today controls approximately 65 percent.3
2. An additional, and critical, question in this analysis examines why (not just how) the
diamond industry employs community institutions, rather than alternative enforcement
mechanisms such as vertical integration, to enforce agreements. This issue is discussed separately
in an accompanying article (Richman 2004), which explains how private enforcement protects
transactions that are beyond the reach of public courts while avoiding the bureaucratic costs
of vertical integration.
3. De Beers’s control of the supply of rough diamonds has declined in recent years as
some mines have begun selling directly to diamond merchants. See note 16 below.
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This predominance has lasted into the twenty-first century, for Jewish
merchants remain disproportionately represented in the world’s diamond
centers of Antwerp, Tel Aviv, and New York. Interestingly, the modern-day
Jewish presence in these diamond centers reaches deeply and most categorically
into the supporting occupations of diamond cutting and diamond brokering.
Eighty percent of all of Amsterdam’s 30,000 cutters in the early twentieth
century were Jewish, and in Antwerp, one-third of all cutters and threefourths of all brokers were Jewish. Similar percentages have been maintained
in today’s diamond centers of New York, Antwerp, and, more obviously, Israel
(Shainberg 1982). In New York’s diamond industry, which is the focus of
this article, the Jewish presence is most profound at the ground level, as
the industry’s brokers and cutters are disproportionately comprised of ultraOrthodox Jews, adherents to an insular and highly ritualistic version of Jewish
practice.4 A visit to Manhattan’s 47th Street and the New York Diamond
Dealers Club (DDC), home to the industry’s trade association and the locus of
the city’s diamond trade, immediately reveals the Orthodox Jewish influence
in the New York diamond world. The street’s many shops and the DDC’s
trading hall are filled with merchants wearing long, untrimmed beards, speaking Yiddish, and dressed in black suits, overcoats, and black hats or caftans.5
Jewish predominance in the industry is somewhat of a puzzle, and it
invites numerous (and not necessarily mutually exclusive) explanations. One
possible explanation invokes history. In pre-Enlightenment Europe, Jews were
prohibited from owning land, ousted from merchant guilds, and excluded
from traditional brands of handicrafts; they thus were forced into becoming
suppliers of finished goods and extenders of credit.6 Jewish communities also
suffered a history of expulsions and forced emigrations from Christian rulers,
so they were drawn to professions with easily portable inventories (Arkin
1975).7 Jews were similarly marginalized in many Middle-Eastern and North
African countries, so Jewish merchants in those areas also searched for
professions that required small fixed investments (Roth 1938; Arkin 1975;
Brenner and Kiefer 1981; Ayal and Chiswick 1983). The diamond trade met
these conditions and thus became attractive to early Jewish merchants.
However, while these observations explain why Jewish merchants were drawn
to the diamond industry and why Jews distanced themselves from occupations
4. For a thorough discussion of ultra-Orthodox Jewry, including a description of its origins
and modern-day expression, see Heilman (1992) and Silber (1992).
5. The New York Times called the DDC and New York’s diamond district “an anachronism,
a 17th-century industry smack in the middle of a 21st century city” Weber (2001).
6. Several prominent Jewish historians, including Roth (1938, 228; 1961a) and Abrahams
(1896), argue that Jewish occupational selection was a product of the many of state restrictions
on Jewish economic activity.
7. It is a popular view that, for similar reasons, Jews invested in portable human capital,
rather than physical capital (e.g., Brenner and Kiefer 1981), but Botticini and Eckstein (2005)
instead attribute Jewish success in urban occupations to the community’s widespread literacy,
which resulted from an emphasis on religious text-based education.
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that involved nonportable fixed assets, they do not explain Jewish success
over non-Jewish competitors. Early predominance suggests not just that the
diamond industry was a last resort, but that Jewish merchants enjoyed a
comparative advantage.
A related explanation relies on path dependence, suggesting that today’s
prevalence of Jewish diamond merchants is merely a product of historical
momentum.8 This approach argues that Jewish merchants seized industry
leadership during a seminal period, perhaps through some fortuitous advantage or historical accident, and that past leadership positioned them favorably
compared to subsequent challengers. This explanation has genuine appeal
for several reasons. First, discussed above, numerous factors centuries ago
induced Jewish merchants to pursue trades with portable goods, and second,
discussed below, the trade exhibits entry barriers that severely restrict outsiders
from challenging industry leadership. However, as Section V illustrates, entry
is not entirely foreclosed. Entrants into the diamond industry, like Jewish
merchants, exhibit the ability to privately enforce executory contracts in large
part because they live in communities structurally similar to their Jewish
counterparts.9 This suggests that entry into the diamond industry is, like any
other industry, limited to those who meet the demands of the trade, and
those who lead the diamond industry enjoy leadership because they meet
those demands best.
Another explanation could rest on a theory of human capital (Becker
1993). This theory suggests that Jewish families or institutions developed
know-how that enables Jewish merchants to excel in the diamond trade.
However, if the unifying commonality among Jewish merchants is their
religious ethnicity, then a human capital theory would argue that an element
of Jewish education or socialization develops skills that contribute to
succeeding in the diamond industry. To be sure, certain elements of Jewish
education and socialization help Jewish merchants organize the diamond
supply chain, such as the prevalence of Yiddish in certain sects, widespread
preferences for religious goods, and the interconnectedness of large families
in intimate communities.10 In addition, the insularity of certain sects and
8. Path dependency is a popular theory in political science literature, popularized in the
seminal article by Alexander Gerschenkron (1962). A good modern example is Zysman (1994).
9. As is discussed in Section V, there is a small but growing non-Jewish component of the
DDC’s 1,800 members. Approximately 15 percent (up from just 2 percent in the late 1980s) of
current DDC members are Indian and have connections to India’s prosperous trade. The Indian
community’s role in the diamond industry is discussed below, but it is worth noting here that the
Indian merchants come disproportionately from a single insular sect, the Palanpuri Jain, who claim
strong ethnic ties and have a tradition of family-based businesses. The mechanisms that enforce
agreements between Jewish merchants may have parallel mechanisms in the Indian community.
10. See notes 39, 52–61 and accompanying text below. Botticini and Eckstein (2005)
advance this sort of human capital theory in arguing that Jewish religious learning promoted
literacy, which in turn led to Jewish economic success in medieval merchant industries. But
this theory cannot explain Jewish diamond industry leadership in the twentieth century, where
literacy is commonplace.
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the intimacy of family networks might facilitate the transmission of critical
skills that only experts can impart, such as diamond cutting and the ability
to inspect and appraise gemstones.11 However, recognizing that Jewish
practice and beliefs play instrumental roles in economic life is distinct
from a human capital theory that identifies specific skills and training
that lead to economic success. Jewish practice might (as is argued here)
contribute to Jewish merchants’ ability to police transactions, credibly
commit to comply with credit obligations, and manage the industry’s
assorted demands, but there is no obvious link between Jewish practice
and the requisite skills to excel in the diamond trade.
A fourth possible explanation for Jewish predominance relies on a theory
suggesting that members of a group might act cooperatively to maximize the
group’s collective income, even if it requires individuals to make sacrifices
to their own income (Krueger 1963). In this “ethnic cartel” model, merchants
in an insular community pledge to charge competitive prices only to its own
community members and to sell goods only at oligopoly prices to nonmembers.
As a result, outsiders are at a disadvantage in entering a supply chain and
competing against insiders. This theory also probably has some merit. The
industry’s entry barriers have secured a lucrative source of income for Jewish
communities for many generations, and the insularity of those communities,
combined with the industry’s strong preference for secrecy and distrust of
outsiders, likely gave favorable treatment to insiders and had anticompetitive
effects similar to many cartels. However, one problem with the ethnic cartel
model, particularly as it is applied to the centuries-old diamond industry, is
that it presumes a cartel has the ability to outlast market forces. Modern
antitrust scholars are generally skeptical of most cartels’ ability to police their
own members and prolong supercompetitive prices, especially in markets (like
the market for diamonds) that exhibit highly differentiable goods and
unpredictable demand (Posner 1969). In contrast, the diamond industry’s
seemingly anachronistic distribution system has sustained itself for over
500 years. Moreover, history illustrates that the diamond industry has, in
fact, opened its doors to entrants from other ethnic groups even as Jewish
predominance has remained, with cross-ethnic trade being a common feature.12
Consequently, ethnic predominance is explained not by cartel behavior, but
rather by a comparative advantage that participating community members

11. Some concentrated centers of diamond cutting expertise have developed much like
other cottage industries of skilled labor or specialized technology. Porter (1985, chap. 9) describes
generally how geographic proximity sustains interrelationships among business units that
generate competitive enterprises. Diamond cutting centers include Idar-Oberstein, a provincial
town in the picturesque Hunsrück Mountains in Germany’s Rhineland that “turns out stonecutters the way Frankfurt does bankers,” and Nor-Hajen, Armenia, a long-time source of master
cutters (Clerizo 2004; Rubin 2001).
12. See note 9 above; see also Section V below.
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enjoy. The proper inquiry, then, is what do successful entrants have in common with those who have long dominated the industry?
This article follows an approach that rests on an efficiency analysis.
While forces invoked by the above alternative theories—historical accidents
combined with institutional inertia and entry barriers, family networks that
support the acquisition of specific skills and human capital, and anticompetitive
collusion facilitated by ethnic familiarity—all likely play some role in explaining
Jewish predominance, it argues that today’s Jewish merchants owe their
success in the diamond trade to a comparative advantage that enables them
to organize diamond transactions more efficiently than potential rivals.13 The
primary comparative advantage Jewish merchants enjoy is the ability to
credibly commit to pay for the diamonds they purchase on credit. Jewish
merchants owe this advantage to complementarities between the demands
for governing diamond transactions and the traditional structure of Jewish
communities. In short, Jewish community institutions can enforce executory
contracts that are beyond the reach of public courts and thus beyond
noncommunity members as well.14
The next section describes the unusual challenges that diamond credit
sales present and explains why public courts cannot enforce executory contracts.
Section IV then explains in detail how Jewish community institutions serve
as unusually effective enforcement mechanisms and thus create a comparative
advantage for Jewish merchants. Since the traditional social structure that
pervaded Jewish communities throughout the world before the Enlightenment

13. The diamond industry is already the beneficiary of several valuable economic
examinations, but previous scholarship placed its emphasis elsewhere. The early works focused
on De Beers’s restrictive sales policy, which bundles many heterogeneous diamonds together
and charges the approximate average price. Yoram Barzel (1977, 1982) first explained that
this unusual practice prevented buyers from engaging in costly efforts to examine and appraise
individual diamonds before their making a purchase, thus permitting De Beers to recoup some
of those savings by charging a higher price. Barzel (1977, 304 –05) concluded, “[h]ad the contents
of a particular bag been available for appraisal by all buyers, each probably would have spent
resources to determine the properties of the diamonds. . . . The incentive for De Beers to engage
in this peculiar form of trade seems to be that buyers are now in a position to spend on the
actual purchase of the diamonds the amount they otherwise might have spent on collecting
information.” Kenney and Klein (1983) articulated a similar argument in their famous paper
examining of “block booking.” The most thorough and most notable economic examination of
the diamond industry was Lisa Bernstein’s (1993) seminal article, which describes the diamond
industry’s elaborate system of private arbitration and its significant efficiencies compared to
public courts. In this and other work (Bernstein 1996, 2001), Bernstein’s identification of
certain procedural efficiencies typical of private adjudication is a lasting contribution to
commercial law.
14. For these reasons, this article closely follows the influential work of Janet Landa (1981,
1988, 1994; Carr and Landa 1983), whose Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group (EHMG)
theory observes that ethnic trading networks in the developing world can organize exchange
at uniquely low transaction costs. It is notable that this article, unlike Landa’s work, examines
the role of community enforcement in a contractual setting where the public courts are readily
available, which suggests that the diamond industry reveals an instance of court failure.

390 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY

remains intact in New York’s ultra-Orthodox communities, an understanding
of what generates current Jewish comparative advantage might also explain
the community’s past economic success.

III. DIAMOND TRANSACTIONS
A. A Diamond’s Path and Time-Inconsistent Exchange
In the $60 billion diamond jewelry industry, a diamond’s path from the
mine to the consumer goes through several intermediaries.15 The journey
for most stones begins in African, Australian, and Canadian mines. Approximately 65 percent of these rough (i.e., unpolished) diamonds go to the De
Beers-controlled Central Selling Organization (CSO) in London,16 and the
CSO distributes its supply of rough diamonds through four brokers, who sell
presorted boxes of diamonds to 125 specific merchants, known as “sightholders,” during individual “sights,” or viewing sessions, in London.17 These
bundles are sold at a nonnegotiable price, and if the sightholder refuses to
purchase at the set price, the holder will not be invited to future sightings.18
Accordingly, sightholders rarely refuse CSO terms since they reap substantial
rents from their valuable position atop the distribution chain.
Sightholders then sell these rough diamonds to a network of individual
dealers, and approximately 80 percent of these initial sales occur in Antwerp’s
four diamond bourses. Then the process of cutting and sorting begins, in which
Antwerp merchants either arrange for polishing the stones themselves or sell
rough diamonds to other dealers who arrange for cutting in India, China, Israel,
New York, and other locations. Dealers continue to resell the rough and polished
15. Global retail sales of diamond jewelry have been estimated at $58.7 billion for 2003. In
2002, when global retail sales were $56.9 billion, the sale of rough diamonds from mines was
$8.35 billion and the value of diamond content in global retail jewelry sales totaled $14.5 billion.
Thus, the total mark-up from rough diamonds to polished wholesale prices is about 75 percent.
16. The De Beers cartel owns the mines of approximately 50 percent of the world’s
diamonds, with the additional 15 percent entering its control through exclusive purchase
agreements. As recently as the 1990s, De Beers controlled 80 percent of the world’s diamonds
and controlled 100 percent in the 1960s. The recent decline in market share resulted from
mines in Russia, Australia, and Canada electing to market their diamonds directly in Antwerp
instead of participating in the CSO cartel. These developments, plus advances in laser
technologies for cutting and polishing diamonds (see Section V below), have prompted De
Beers to change its business strategy away from market control and toward marketing a brand
name (Weber 2001; Muller 2001).
17. De Beers has reduced the number of sightholders over the past few years. Kenny
and Klein (1983) spoke of approximately 300 sightholders and Bernstein (1992) wrote about
150–200 sightholders. Recent reports now list 125 sightholders, and some indications suggest
that De Beers plans to further reduce that number to as little as 60. This is part of De Beers’
recent effort to consolidate the industry (see Muller 2001).
18. For a discussion of the efficiency implications of this distribution method, see Kenny
and Klein (1983).
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diamonds, in increasingly smaller bundles, until they reach a jewelry manufacturer
for commercial sale. Many dealers also use brokers, who work on small commissions, to assist these sales and find the best price for a given stone.
The reliance on the numerous intermediaries is necessitated by widely
divergent valuations for individual stones. Different end consumers place very
different values on a given stone (depending both on an intended use for
a diamond and on subjective judgments), so finding the optimal buyer for
a specific stone is a highly profitable enterprise. However, determining a
diamond’s qualities and ultimate value is extremely difficult to do without
conducting a personal inspection, and the process of sorting and evaluating
diamonds is time-consuming and effort-intensive (Barzel 1977, 1982;
Kenny and Klein 1983). Consequently, the industry is home to many
middlemen who create value and earn substantial profits by ascertaining the
particular demands of individual end-users, learning how much buyers will
pay, evaluating the qualities of individual stones, and then matching certain
types of stones with particular buyers. The matching process through intermediaries continues even after stones reach New York. In one day, a diamond
can move from one end of New York’s 47th Street diamond center to the other,
doubling in value after passing through seven or eight hands (Weber 2001).
Accordingly, a typical diamond will pass through many transactions before
it reaches a consumer, and such sales regularly involve passionate negotiations
over price, payment schedule, method of payment, and credit security.
Despite the steady stream of diamond transactions, neither the flow of
diamond supply nor the flow of demand is constant. On the supply end, there
are ten CSO sights each year, one held approximately every five weeks. The
sightholders are required to pay the CSO in full within seven days of the
sight, but it can take as long as four months for a manufacturer to sort, polish,
and sell all of the diamonds in the bundle. Similarly, dealers who are not
sightholders purchase their supply of diamonds on a cycle that shadows schedule
of sights. On the demand side, retail demand for diamonds is highly seasonal,
as 30–40 percent of all U.S. sales occur in November and December. By
contrast, the pace of manufacturing, particularly diamond cutting and
polishing, which involves one cutter and one stone at a time, is constant.19
Therefore, efficient utilization of diamond cutters requires polishing stones
throughout the year, despite the irregularity of supply and demand.20

19. In fact, cutting technology for large stones has changed very little over the past
centuries. Cutters hold a diamond firmly in a metal grip and deliberately place it at a desired
angle against a rotating grinding wheel. In earlier generations, the grinding wheel was rotated
mechanically by hand cranks or foot petals, whereas modern grinding wheels are electric and
use more sophisticated grips, but the underlying process is essentially the same.
20. Historically, diamond merchants have always had to balance capacity constraints in
manufacturing and polishing with waves of supply and demand. For example, an economic
boom in 1820 Amsterdam led to the emergence of many new factories, but work was never
constant and cutters were hired only temporarily.
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Consequently, selling diamonds on credit is far more preferable than
simultaneous exchange. Credit sales allow merchants to adjust their
inventories and manufacturing schedules to the ebbs and flows of supply and
demand. Moreover, liquidity constraints are very tight for merchants since
most merchants are self-employed or work for small family businesses, not
for heavily capitalized corporations, and many dealers are simply unable to
pay upfront for substantial purchases (dealers generally concede that they can
get a significantly better price for a stone if they extend credit to their buyers).
Accordingly, most dealers match payments for credit purchases with the
anticipated revenue from downstream sales, and the predominant diamond
transaction is the executory contract that features a time-inconsistent
exchange and a separation of the quid from the quo.21 The role of credit
in diamond transactions is so central that the market for diamonds has been
called “an implicit capital market” (Bernstein 1992).

B. The Challenge —Enforcing Diamond Executory Contracts
Given the importance of credit sales, the diamond industry depends
overwhelmingly on the reliable enforcement of executory contracts. However,
while most industries can employ state-sponsored courts to enforce payment
after the delivery of goods,22 public courts are toothless to enforce credit sales
for diamonds. Diamonds are easily portable and command extreme value
throughout the world. A diamond thief encounters little difficulty in hiding
unpaid-for or stolen diamonds from law enforcement officials, fleeing American
jurisdiction, and selling the valuable diamonds to black market buyers.23 The courts’
failure to prevent flight amounts to a failure to enforce the executory contract.
21. An alternative to selling diamonds on credit is for a diamond merchant to seek credit
elsewhere. However, as Bernstein (1992) explains, diamond merchants can obtain credit from
each other at a lower cost than they could elsewhere. First, they save the additional set of
transaction costs that accompany a third party, such as a bank or other provider of credit.
Second, if diamond merchants transact with each other regularly, they have more information
about the buyer’s creditworthiness than would a bank, thus reducing adverse selection costs.
22. Of course, it has been long recognized, particularly since Stewart Macaulay’s (1963)
seminal work, that businesspeople in all industries largely resolve their disputes without resorting
to state courts. Similar modern-day instances of informal contract enforcement appear in
Ellickson (1989; 1993), McMillan and Woodruff (1999), Fafchamps (1996), Banerjee and Duflo
(2000), and Clay (1997).
23. Diamond theft continues to be a severe problem for the industry despite technological
advances in security. In 2003, rough diamonds worth approximately $100,000,000 were stolen
from Antwerp vaults, and in 2004 petty thieves stole more than $300,000 worth of Elvis Presley’s
jewelry from the Elvis-A-Rama museum, including the King’s ruby diamond ring and his
diamond pendant and chain. Relatedly, fugitives continue to transfer their assets into diamonds
before escaping law enforcement. A recent example is Martin Frankel, the troubled fugitive
financier whose collapsed financial schemes prompted federal prosecution. During his attempted
escape from U.S. authorities, he arranged a shadowy purchase of several million dollars of
diamonds hours before his flight from the United States (Pollack 2002).

How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage 393

The failure of public courts requires diamond merchants to rely on
trust-based exchange.24 Mutual trust among merchants—which the New York
Times has called “the real treasure of 47th street”—assures dealers that by
maintaining a trustworthy reputation, they will remain in good community
standing and preserve the opportunity to engage in future lucrative transactions (Starr 1984). Through this mutual trust, dealers comfortably engage
in executory contracts despite the unreliability of state courts.
However, trust is an “elusive notion” (Gambetta 1988) and has been
invoked to explain a wide variety of phenomena. Prior scholarship has
formulated trust as a societal bond that organizes national industry (Dore
1983; 1989, chap. 9), a familial or community bond that organizes ethnic
trading networks (Carr and Landa 1983; Landa 1994), and, in a more intimate
context, a necessity for personal functioning. Scholars have also used trust
to explain broad trends of economic development, from the success of credit
associations (Geertz 1962; Ardener 1964; Velez-Ibanez 1983) to regional and
national economic performance (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995). In recent
years, many prominent thinkers have developed simplified conceptions of
trust that amount to purely self-interested behavior. James Coleman (1990),
for example, translates “relations of trust” that are popular in the sociology
literature into a rational choice formulation, and Russell Hardin (2002)
advances an “encapsulated interest” theory that states that individuals trust
those persons whom they believe will act to advance their well-being. Similar
accounts by game theorists explain mutual trust with utility-maximizing
models that rest on rational and calculative actors (Dasgupta 1988; Kreps
1990). The approach taken in this article resembles the calculative trust that
is captured by game theorists, but it more closely follows Oliver Williamson’s
“hyphenated trust” that, while adhering to the economist’s taste for utility
maximization, recognizes that since “man, after all, is a ‘social animal,’
then socialization and social approvals and sanctions are also pertinent”
(Williamson 1993, 475).25
However, utility-maximizing notions of “trust” invite other challenges.
Partha Dasgupta has observed, “[i]f the incentives are ‘right,’ even a trustworthy
person can be relied upon to be untrustworthy” (Dasgupta 1988, 54), and
such are the “incentives” presented by diamond transactions. According to
simple game theory, parties to a transaction will not trust their counterpart
unless both parties know that the present value of profits from future exchange
will exceed the one-time gain from cheating—this, of course, is a simple
24. The undesirability of alternative institutions to secure diamond transactions, such
as vertical integration, is discussed in Richman (2004).
25. Hyphenated trust might resemble the pursuit of self-interest within an embedded social
framework (see Granovetter 1985), and this combination of calculativeness and embeddedness
might best capture the mutual trust shared between diamond merchants. Trust in these
circumstances is deliberate and purposeful, but it occurs within a rich network of family and
community institutions that shape interactions and preempt calculativeness.
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version of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Axelrod 1984). However, the
Prisoner’s Dilemma for the diamond transaction presents a particularly
difficult hurdle for cooperation because while cooperating often yields only
nominal profits, cheating, such as running off with unpaid diamonds, produces
a tremendous monetary gain. Many credit sales involve large quantities of
diamonds, and brokers regularly have many diamonds in their possession that
they do not own, so the opportunity to steal another’s diamonds is both
readily available and tremendously valuable.26 In contrast, the industry’s
competitiveness makes profit margins very thin—especially for brokers, whose
commissions can be as low as 1 to 2 percent of a sale.27 Moreover, multilateral
cooperation throughout a market is significantly more difficult to explain
than bilateral cooperation between two players, since players in a multilateral
game do not know with whom they will transact in the future and may not
know the past actions of their current business partners.
Despite these features of the diamond transaction—the extremely valuable
opportunities to cheat, the relatively low payoffs from dealing honestly, the
unavailability of public courts, and the need to know that one’s business
partners are trustworthy—the diamond industry is able to sustain widespread
multilateral cooperation. Part of this is undoubtedly because merchants do
more than maximize intertemporal profits. General notions of reciprocal
fairness and cooperation motivate diamond merchants, just as experimental
results have shown they motivate most individuals.28 Also, as a general matter,
diamond merchants value their standing and participation in their communities and do not want to lead a fugitive’s life.29 Nonetheless, because of
the extreme value of cheating and the corresponding costliness to a merchant
who has been cheated, general notions of fairness and morality are insufficient
to secure trust-based exchange, and the industry relies instead on several
distinctive industry and community institutions. The most important source
of the industry’s success lies in the particular identities and preferences of
the individuals involved in diamond transactions.

26. Cheating in the paradigmatic sense is refusing to pay for diamonds received
from another merchant, but cheating opportunities are by no means limited to theft.
Other ways that merchants can cheat—and issues that cause serious concern among
diamond merchants—include submitting payment late and lying about a diamond’s quality
or origin.
27. Profit margins tend to vary according to a merchant’s location on the distribution
chain. Merchants who are perched atop the distribution chain, in particular De Beers sightholders, likely benefit from some oligopoly rents and do enjoy lucrative businesses. The
paradigmatic challenge remains, however, particularly as an end-game problem.
28. For surveys of empirical evidence suggesting that many individuals, even in economic
settings, are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity, see Fehr and Falk
(2001). There are also efforts to formalize notions of fairness in generally applicable models.
Compare Fehr and Schmidt (1999) with Rabin (1993).
29. This issue is discussed extensively in Section IV. See notes 53–58 below.
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IV. ENFORCING EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
Sustaining reputation-based exchange relies on mechanisms that inform
all parties of the reputations, or past behavior, of potential business partners.
This section first describes how the New York Diamond Dealers’ Club, the
diamond district’s bourse and the industry’s epicenter, serves the critical role
of disseminating reputation information and enabling trust-based exchange
between individuals who do not intimately know each other. Still, even under
full information, the lucrative opportunities to cheat suggest that cooperation
would be extremely difficult to sustain, so the remainder of this section
describes how intergenerational family businesses and tightly knit ethnic
communities enable cooperation.

A. The New York Diamond Dealers Club30
Sustained cooperation in New York’s diamond industry supports a
tremendous amount of commerce. Nearly half of the world’s $60 billion
diamond jewelry sales are in the United States (Feifer 2004; Time 2004),
and 47th Street merchants handle over 95 percent of the diamonds
imported into the United States (Lueck 1997). Manhattan’s crowded
diamond district and the DDC serve as the gateway to the lucrative
American market.
In addition to providing a high-security trading hall that is safe for
diamond inspection and sales, the DDC also serves as the industry’s
trade association and provides structure to diamond transactions. Comprised
of 1,800 members, the DDC issues trading rules to govern diamond
sales and provides a mandatory private arbitration system to resolve all
disputes between merchants. This private system replaces any opportunity
to seek redress from a state court, and any member that does attempt to
adjudicate in state courts will be fined or suspended from the club (DDC
Bylaws, Art. XXII, § 1a). DDC members are elected to serve as arbitrators,
and only members held in the highest esteem win election. The arbitration
panels deliberate in secret, pass down rulings without written justifications
or creating case law, and all arbitration rulings are final. The private

30. The New York Diamond Dealers Club was founded in 1931 with twelve founding
incorporators and fifty original members. Modeled after the diamond bourses that served
Europe’s older and larger diamond industries, its membership grew substantially in 1944 –45
when many European dealers were able to immigrate to the United States (Lubin 1982). Many
European diamond dealers fleeing Europe before the Nazi invasions of Holland and Belgium
sought temporary refuge in Cuba, Mexico, and Brazil before returning to Europe or immigrating
to the United States (Federman 1985).
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arbitration system has been hailed as an efficient and highly effective
enforcement mechanism.31
However, like state courts, the DDC’s private arbitration system is wholly
incapable of enforcing agreements on its own and is toothless in punishing
diamond theft. The DDC’s arbitration board can issue fines or revoke an
individual’s Club membership, but these sanctions are effective only if the
party intends to continue transacting in diamonds and are meaningless if
that party decides never to transact again. While decisions by the DDC’s
arbitration committee are enforceable in New York’s state courts,32 such appeals
very rarely occur since state courts also cannot prevent a thief from escaping
to a hidden location and disposing of stolen diamonds. In any event, many
dealers, particularly middleman brokers, are essentially judgment proof, so
remedies from both public courts and private arbitration panels will be unable
to recover adequate damages from a person who has squandered another’s
diamonds and subsequently becomes unable to pay.33 Illustrating the limitations of both public and private enforcement mechanisms is the following
admission by one diamond dealer: “the truth is that if someone owes you
money, there’s no real way to get it from him if he doesn’t want to pay you.”34
Consequently, the reach of the DDC arbitration board is limited to
cooperating parties, as it has no inherent power to force any individual to
pay an arbitration award. Merchants comply with the DDC arbitration board
31. Because DDC arbitrators are highly familiar with the diamond industry and archetypal
diamond transactions, their expertise yields certain sizable administrative savings (for example,
their expertise substantially aids the evidentiary process of recognizing stolen goods). Plus, DDC
arbitration procedures are tailored for typical disputes, so litigation costs are relatively low
and arbitration rulings are swift, reflect the accuracy of experts, and assess appropriate remedies.
For a full discussion of the administrative efficiencies of the DDC’s private arbitration system,
see Bernstein (1992, 135–38, 148–51).
32. A party can appeal an arbitration board decision to New York state court only if
there is a procedural irregularity. The board’s substantive decisions are not reviewed. See
Rabinowitz v. Olewski, 473 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Goldfinger v Lisker, 68 N.Y.2d
225 (N.Y. 1986).
33. Concerns about payment are contractual hazards that place a risk on the seller. A
second category of contractual hazards involves risks assumed by the buyer. For example, diamonds can receive laser treatments that improve the stone’s color, but a treated diamond is
less valuable than an untreated diamond of equal color. Since only a complex laser examination
can detect whether a diamond is treated, a buyer often makes a purchase based on a seller’s
representation.
Similarly, a diamond’s origins cannot be verified upon inspection. This has become increasingly relevant with the rise of “conflict diamonds” mined in some African nations (particularly
Angola, Sierra Leone, and Congo) by political-military organizations determined to overthrow
a recognized government. Since the conflict diamond sales fund some of the most brutal military
campaigns, many consumers refuse to purchase them and many jewelers refuse to use them
(note: none of the diamonds sold by the Central Selling Organization are conflict diamonds).
They nonetheless make their way through an elaborate global network from the African mines
to Antwerp for sale. De Beers estimates that conflict diamonds constitute 4 percent of the
world’s market, though the U.S. and U.K. governments suspect that the figure is significantly
higher (Buchan et al. 2000; Smith 1999; Oppenheimer 1999).
34. Interview with the author, March 2001.
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only to preserve good reputations and protect the opportunity to engage in
future diamond transactions. Accordingly, the DDC’s role is purely informational, and the power of its dispute resolution system rests on the degree to
which it supports trust-based exchange and can foreclose future transactions
to uncooperative merchants. The DDC fulfills this role by facilitating
information exchange and publicizing individual reputations.35
The DDC supports information exchange with several mechanisms.
First, the floor of the trading hall is bustling with information about parties
and market conditions, and some traders spend time on the trading floor
just to keep abreast of available information. Traders on the floor will ask others
about potential business partners and get references, and supplementary credit
reports about diamond buyers float throughout the trading community.36
Thus, the Club creates both a physical and a relational infrastructure that
facilitates information sharing between members.
A second mechanism is the wall of the trading floor. The wall posts
the pictures, background, and references of any visitor to the Club, providing
easy referral for potential business dealings (most visitors are required to be
sponsored by a member, who is cited as a reference along with the visitor’s
picture). The wall also announces the nomination of potential new members
and invites current members to comment on the candidate’s reputation. Most
importantly, the wall publicizes the judgments from recent disputes before
the arbitration board and posts the picture—not unlike a “Wanted” poster—
of any party who is responsible for an outstanding debt. This information
is shared with all of the world’s bourses, so pictures of delinquent debtors
from across the world are broadcast prominently in the DDC trading hall.
Conversely, maintaining good standing as a DDC member—and preventing
one’s picture from ever reaching the wall—also functions as an important
information signal.
The DDC’s system of arbitration and information exchange thus sets
the stage for other family- and community-based institutions to enforce the
industry’s executory contracts; if the DDC announces the verdict, then these
complementary institutions are the sheriffs that enforce it. The DDC is able
to rely on community institutions because individuals who share intimate

35. Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990) similarly characterize the role of private judges
in supporting trade between sixteenth century Law Merchants in the Champagne Fairs. The
judges’ power did not arise from an inherent power to enforce agreements but rather from
the ability to disseminate information and support a reputation mechanism.
Historically, the foremost function of all diamond bourses and their less established
predecessors has always been to facilitate a flow of information about market participants and
business opportunities (Shainberg 1982, 308). Bernstein (1992, 121) puts it succinctly: “The
bourse is an information exchange as much as it is a commodities exchange.”
36. One useful information source on creditworthiness is the Rapaport Diamond Report,
which collects information about many diamond purchasers, particularly jewelry manufacturers,
and assigns each a credit rating. It is the Moody’s of the diamond industry.
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family and community ties dominate its membership.37 As was noted above,
nearly 85–90 percent of DDC members are Jewish, and a visitor is struck
by a pervasive presence of Ultra-Orthodox Jewry in the Club.38 Since
Orthodox Jews tend to live in discrete, insular communities, familiar business
relationships are also familiar community relationships, and the members’
ties to each other do not end at the Club’s door. Moreover, family ties also
connect Club members, as many members gain entry through the sponsorship
of close relatives.39 In short, extended family and community networks
cement the Club’s larger community and reinforce the intimate familiarity
and interdependence that Club members have with each other.

B. The Parties
The driving force behind diamond merchants’ ability to participate in
trust-based exchange is their membership to unique sociodemographic groups.
This is a system that bases the credibility of one’s commitments on his
identity,40 and a merchant’s membership in these intimate groups is what
enables him to make contractual promises that fellow merchants find reliable.
This ability to make trustworthy promises—to commit credibly to a contractual
obligation that state courts cannot enforce—is what gives New York’s diamond
merchants comparative advantages over outsiders.41 They can purchase goods
on credit and gain valuable market information from an insular network.
The identity of each diamond merchant can be placed in one of two
distinct categories. In one category fall the “long-term players.” These merchants
enjoy family connections to the industry and usually have a proprietary
stake in a family-run business. They gain entry into the industry through
37. The DDC currently has approximately 1,800 members, and in most years there is a
waiting list for membership. Dealers petitioning for membership must survive a rigorous informational review: applicants must (1) have worked in the industry for at least two years, (2)
comply with the board of directors’ requests for information, and (3) have his picture posted
on the trading floor wall for ten days so members have an opportunity to comment (DDC
Bylaws, Art. 3, § 8). More lenient precedures, however, govern the admission of the immediate
family members of DDC members in good standing (DDC Bylaws, Art.3, § 3b).
38. The other significant contingent of the DDC’s membership is Indian, who comprise
approximately 10 percent of all members, see note 9 above, and are discussed at length in
Section V below.
39. Another gateway to entry—one that invites community members and excludes others—
is the predominance of Yiddish and Hebrew among merchants. Many ultra-Orthodox use
Yiddish as the vernacular, and the many Israelis in the industry make Hebrew widely used.
40. Given the nature of the diamond industry, this article’s use of male pronouns is
generally accurate and is not intended to be an excluding shorthand. But female diamond
merchants have been playing increasingly significant roles (see Pogrebin 1998).
41. While diamonds pose significant credibility challenges for credit sales, Brinig (1990)
argues that they served to solve a credibility problem of another sort, that “engagement rings
were part of an extralegal contract guarantee” that bound parties to their promise to marry
and replaced the old cause of action for a breach of a marriage promise.
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the sponsorship of a family elder, and they employ younger family members
to whom they eventually bequeath the family business. Thus, the long-term
players are inducted into intergenerational family businesses, work in the
family business for their entire careers, and then pass on the same business
to their descendents. The second group consists of religious community
members, and most workers in this category belong to ultra-Orthodox Jewish
communities. These workers are committed to the austere lifestyles of ultraOrthodoxy, yet they frequently are in possession of enormously valuable
caches of diamonds. The pervasiveness of this second group, the industry’s
“diamond-studded paupers,” is a truly striking feature of the diamond trade.42
When they fill the DDC trading halls, they transact as their ancestors did
in Europe’s bazaar markets, though instead of trinkets or small crafts, these
paupers peddle caches of precious diamonds.
Interestingly, a merchant’s identity tends to predict his role in the distribution network: long-term players are primarily dealers or buyers (including
jewelry manufacturers), and religious paupers serve chiefly as contractors.43
Contracted parties include brokers, who search for a buyer and retain a small
sales commission, and diamond cutters, who cut or polish a diamond for a
fixed fee. Both brokers and cutters assume possession of the diamond but
never own it, and they give neither payment nor collateral to the diamond
owner when they take possession.
Stark differences separate the two categories of merchants—the longterm players from the religious paupers, the dealers from the contractors. Most
but not all the long-term players are Jewish, whereas the paupers are ultraOrthodox Jews. And unlike the long-term players, the contractors find their
way into the industry through community connections. These contractors
generally are not connected to family businesses and do not build up a business
that they hope to bequeath to a child. In fact, these ultra-Orthodox prefer
that their sons commit their lives to Torah study and find financial support
without having to work regularly. Whereas the long-term players desire to
build up profitable businesses that they can bequeath to their descendants,
the contractors hope to accumulate sufficient resources for themselves only
so they can leave the business and devote their time to religious study.44
42. Daily buses carry scores of workers directly from Boro Park, Monsey, and Williamsburg—
all homes to concentrated ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities—to the diamond district on
47th Street.
43. These categories are not perfect, as there is some overlap. Some brokers maintain
an inventory of diamonds and sell for capital gains rather than commissions, and some dealers
carry another’s diamonds for consignment. Similarly, some merchants with family connections
are also deeply embedded within the Orthodox community and are motivated by the same
community institutions that constrain brokers. However, brokers, or those without a stake in
a family business, are overwhelmingly from the ultra-Orthodox community, as every merchant
is constrained either through intergenerational incentives or through community institutions.
44. Berman (2000) describes a process where one generation accumulates capital specifically
so their children can engage in full-time religious study well into their productive adult years.
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The important observation is that members from these very different
groups are motivated and constrained by different forces. All parties engage
in a type of time-inconsistent exchange in which delivery of the diamond
precedes any payment. But, since the parties are from two very different
groups, they are connected to different community institutions, are
constrained by different individuals or institutions, have different business
incentives, and have different preferences. Consequently, distinct mechanisms are required to induce the two types of parties to comply with their
contractual obligations. What induces one group to cooperate cannot explain
the behavior of the other.

C. Long-Term Players
Though dealers and buyers rely on different industry skills and
occupy different locations in the distribution system, a key commonality is
that both are long-term players in the industry. Sellers have a steady supply
of diamonds they need to sell, and buyers, most of whom are jewelry
manufacturers, rely on being able to purchase precious stones to keep up
with demand. Following the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma paradigm, this
long-term market participation allows the prospect of future sales to induce
cooperation for current sales.
The diamond industry introduces two important complications to the
simple Prisoner’s Dilemma. First, the industry involves many players who
do not necessarily know with whom they will transact in the future, so
the prospects of future dealings with a current business partner are not
sufficiently certain to induce multilateral cooperation. The second is that
the extreme value of diamonds may require an unusually credible mechanism
to assure endless exchange (a solution to the end-game problem) and a very
low discount rate to support cooperation. These complications are addressed
in turn.

1. Sustaining Multilateral Cooperation
For cooperation to be sustained when there are many industry
players, each player must always be induced by the prospect of future business
with other players. In other words, when a player transacts with business
partner (B) in time period (t = 0), he must be induced by the prospect of
future transactions with partners (≠B) in periods (t > 0). This is accomplished
by a reputation mechanism. If each player’s past dealings are known, such
that all potential business partners know whether a certain merchant
has cheated in the past, and all merchants refuse to transact with an
individual who has cheated, then all players will be sufficiently induced to
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cooperate, even with business partners with whom they will never do
business again.45
Illustrating how a reputation mechanism can induce cooperation
under these conditions does not require a complex mathematical proof.
Individual players will cooperate so long as the system promises that
their long-run returns will exceed the potential profits from cheating. The
burdensome features of the proof are its very demanding conditions: widespread information, accurate information, and coordinated punishment.46
These conditions enable a reputation mechanism to support multilateral
exchange.
The diamond industry has all three. The DDC educates dealers about
potential business partners by supporting information networks in which
dealers share valuable information with each other, and the Club’s arbitration
committee disseminates its decisions and publicizes the names of those it
has determined have not complied with their obligations.47 As a result of
these information mechanisms, any member can research the past of a
potential business partner and can learn whether he was noncompliant in
a previous transaction.
The reliability of reputation information, not just its dissemination, is
also crucial to ensure proper incentives to cooperate, and thus several forces
complement information sources to ensure their veracity. One source of
guaranteeing accuracy is the DDC’s arbitration board. The arbitration board
is comprised of insiders who are extremely familiar with the nature of the
industry and the difficulties involved in entering diamond contracts. Their
expertise helps arbitrators understand the context within which disputes
arise, distinguish meritorious from nonmeritorious claims, verify the veracity
of proffered evidence, and, when appropriate, estimate the appropriate
damages. Additionally, the board may respond to misinformation and punish
any party responsible for spreading inaccurate information about another’s
reputation.48

45. The basis for this model is found in Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990). Kreps
(1990) offers another important model that rests on similar logic but emphasizes bilateral rather
than multilateral repeat interactions. For a historical example involving cross-continental
medieval trade, see Greif (1989, 1993).
46. Given these demanding conditions, some scholars are more skeptical than others
over the viability of reputation-based systems of private ordering. Compare Kreps (1990)
(presenting a model for reputation mechanisms) with Williamson (1991, 167–69) (detailing
the rigorous requirements to support trust-based exchange and the many factors that could
disrupt such exchange systems).
47. See notes 35–37 and accompanying text above.
48. In one case, a dealer falsely accused another of stealing his stone. He later realized
that he actually misplaced the stone and apologized to the dealer, but the accusation had already
become common knowledge. The second dealer then brought the first before the arbitration
committee for impugning his reputation, and the board ordered the false accuser to make a
public apology and donate $50,000 to a Jewish charity (Bernstein 1992, 127).
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Another force working to ensure the accuracy of reputation information
is the rigorous set of Jewish laws that strictly regulate the information one
is permitted, prohibited, and required to disclose regarding another individual.
For example, Jewish law forbids individuals from knowingly disseminating
false and damaging information about others, and it also requires individuals
to have compelling reasons for sharing information that, even if truthful, is
damaging or unflattering to another.49 Jewish law does not, however, place
excessive barriers to communicating reputation information that prevent a
merchant from obtaining the information necessary to sustain his livelihood.
To the contrary, Jewish law mandates the sharing of damaging yet truthful
reputation information if such information would be of substantial use to
the recipient, so long as it is not exaggerated, is shared only because it would
aid the recipient, and is shared only to the degree necessary to assist the
recipient (Broyde 1996). These religious rules help filter communications
to increase their accuracy—deterring the spread of misinformation and
unnecessary information—without unduly preventing the dissemination of
useful information. In a world where good reputations are so critical to
commercial success, and where gossip can be so damaging, these filters are
important in discouraging aimless information of questionable veracity.
The third condition for an effective reputation mechanism is to credibly
ensure that the expected benefits of cooperation will exceed the expected
benefits from cheating, or put otherwise, that a cheater will be sufficiently
punished so that cheating is less attractive than cooperating indefinitely. The
industry punishes such cheaters by exacting coordinated punishment, such
that all merchants refuse to do business with a merchant who has failed to
comply with a contractual obligation in the past. A merchant who has failed
to pay a debt or refused to comply with an arbitration ruling will be expelled
from the DDC, find his transgression publicized, and fail to obtain future
business. Conceivably a past cheater, after acquiring a bad reputation and
finding that normally available business opportunities are foreclosed, might
offer a premium to a merchant to convince him to do business (in which the
cheater’s losses from selling at discounted prices could be less than the
one-time gain from cheating). Yet because industry reputations extend not
just to a merchant’s actions but also to the identity of his business partners,
a merchant’s own reputation may suffer if he is known to transact with
previous cheaters. Moreover, given the strong demand for transactional
security, merchants generally do not assume the danger of extending credit
to individuals who they know have failed previously to comply with payment
obligations. Since past cheaters enjoy fewer business opportunities than

49. Jewish law imposes three distinct prohibitions: knowingly communicating false,
negative statements about another (motzi shem rah); making unflattering, but true, remarks
about a person for no reason (lashon harah); and recounting to a person gossip heard about
him (rekhilut) (Broyde 1996, 77 [citing Maimonides, Deot 7:1–7]).
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honest brokers, they have less incentive to sustain cooperation and thus
pose greater risks.50

2. Securing an Infinite Time Horizon and a Low Discount Rate
If cheating brings extreme one-time rewards, even the threat of banning
an individual from all future diamond transactions may not be enough to
force compliance. Moreover, individuals present an end-game problem if their
participation in the trade reaches an inevitable end. Cooperation is sustained
only if parties have an endless future of exchanges and an unlikely low discount
rate.51 The diamond industry’s consistent presence of family-based firms
accomplishes both of these. The intergenerational nature of the family firms
extends the time horizon for cooperation beyond the limited lifespan of an
individual dealer. So long as a diamond dealer is concerned about his family’s
reputation and not just his own, he will continue to have incentives to
cooperate even if he plans to retire soon. Parties would only cheat if they
knew there were a finite number of future transactions.
For this mechanism to work, reputation information has to be familyspecific, not just individual-specific. This is, in fact, how reputation operates
in the diamond trade. While an individual is trusted and receives business
based on his reputation, a young dealer inherits the reputation of his family
mentor. Part of this is because the elder sponsors the young relative during
his early dealings (by explicitly promising to cover any losses anyone incurs
by dealing with the young relative), but an individual’s family connections
and associations are very important in attracting business trust even when
that sponsorship ends. The DDC Bylaws, which impose easier membership
requirements for spouses, widows, sons, daughters, and sons- and daughtersin-law of current members, also reflect how extended family relationships
extend trustworthiness (DDC Bylaws, Art. 3, §§ 2a, 3b). Reputation capital
can also extend beyond the immediate family, as cousins, nieces, and nephews
of respected dealers enjoy some initial trust when they enter the industry.
50. While reputations are fragile and extremely difficult to recover once damaged, rehabilitation is sometimes possible if a well-respected industry member offers assistance. In some instances
a merchant who has failed to comply with a commitment he made consequently has suffered harm
to his reputation, an elder merchant—motivated as much by compassion as by profit—will agree
to a deal with him in order to rehabilitate the failed merchant’s reputation. This reflects the balance
between the serious need to deter cheating with the compassionate recognition that individuals have
human frailties. It also is consistent with models of cooperation in which entry costs, or gift giving,
are required before entering into a trust-based network of exchange (Carmichael and MacLeod 1997).
51. Some diamond dealers enjoy sizable incomes (De Beers wants to maintain stable downstream distributors and shares some of its monopoly rents with dealers), suggesting that the
threat of individual sanctions, without an infinite time horizon, might be sufficient to induce
cooperation. Nonetheless, the end-game problem—presented as each long-term merchant
approaches the end of his career—forces the diamond industry to develop a creative solution
to the Prisoner’s Dilemma paradigm.
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The value of a family’s reputation has three important economic
implications. First, individuals supported by a family reputation have an
important advantage over otherwise identical entrepreneurs who have no
family connections, creating a powerful barrier to entry to outsiders. Certainly,
the vast majority of entry-level positions are acquired because of family
connections, but family reputations remain important throughout one’s career.
New acquaintances are introduced in reference to their family, and thus new
business opportunities are either created or foreclosed by the quality of one’s
family reputation, and prospective entrepreneurs without family sponsorship
or introductions are routinely met with deep skepticism and distrust. Second,
and most obviously, the family-based nature of businesses secures future riches
for relatives who currently hold entry-level positions. Young relatives-employees
who handle their elder’s diamonds have the very reasonable expectation
that they will inherit the business. This is enough to make their individual
time horizons very long and induce them to cooperate. And third, and the
economic consequence most critical to sustaining cooperation for multiple
generations, reputation can be both bequeathed and leveraged. If a leader
of a family business has a good reputation, he can bequeath the reputation
to several descendants. Accordingly, the elder merchant is motivated by the
prospect of a larger number of future transactions than just the number he
would execute if he lived forever. So an individual’s imminent retirement
is no cause for an end-game problem. In fact, the opposite may be true—
when a dealer nears the end of his career, he knows that his reputation will
influence the transactions of several relatives. This premium on future transactions is critical to sustain cooperation in the face of large returns from
one-time defections.
Significantly, the role of Jewish community institutions in sustaining
multi-generational cooperation is mostly secondary to the importance of
family connections and industry rules. Jewish norms and the intimacy of the
Jewish community play valuable functions in spreading information among
industry players and in coordinating punishment, but the Jewish community
is not alone in its ability to spread accurate information. The only irreplaceable
aspect of long-term players is their predominant tendency to be connected to
intergenerational family businesses, and that feature is by no means exclusive
to the Jewish community.52 The value of family here is paramount, and the value
of the ultra-Orthodox participation is necessary only for short-term players.

D. “Diamond Studded Paupers”
The ultra-Orthodox brokers and cutters, who constitute the second
category of diamond merchants, provide important value-added services and
52. See Section V below (discussing intergenerational Belgian and Indian family firms).
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are critical in making the diamond industry profitable. However, since they
are much less likely to bring their descendants into the diamond trade, the
prospects of future exchange are insufficient to induce them to cooperate.
In fact, because of their commitment to ultra-Orthodox Judaism and their
love for traditional religious learning, they would like nothing more than
to stop working and engage in full-time study. Their rewards for cooperating
must take effect within a much shorter time period.
Two additional important features characterize these workers. First,
unlike the successful dealers and jewelry manufacturers, they are not wealthy
people. Though this is easily explained by their low skills set and the very
competitive labor market for unskilled brokers, it is nevertheless remarkable
given the industry in which they work: these workers have lots of diamonds,
but no money. The consequence is startling. Scores of diamonds fall from
these workers’ fingertips, yet they are dressed in tattered clothes.
Second, these workers operate with a tremendous degree of informality.
Contracts are informal, and many operate their businesses without paper
records. A diamond cutter, for example, will have piles of diamonds before
him, each wrapped in a small piece of paper and placed in an envelope.
Clients will drop off such envelopes, with the owner’s name written on the
outside and some cutting instructions inside, then leave without a verifiable
record that their valuable cache of diamonds are in another’s possession.
For these workers, the attractiveness of theft (given their low wages) and
the ease of theft (given their informality) belie a simple profit maximization
model and demand a more complicated utility theory to explain sustained
cooperation. One useful model that can explain seemingly noneconomic behavior,
and one that has been employed by scholars of religious sects, is a “club good”
model (Cornes and Sandler).53 In clubs, members have preferences for both
standard consumption goods and excludable club-specific goods, and their
utilities are determined by a joint function of both goods. Club goods are
available only in the club, only club members can consume club goods, and each
member of the club experiences externalities from every other member’s behavior.
Consequently, club members strive to obtain club goods just as they would standard goods, and relatedly, the club (or community) will manipulate the consumption of club goods in order to induce behavior that is desirable to the club.54
53. Berman (2000) uses the club good model to explain several seemingly uneconomic
practices in the ultra-Orthodox community, including the expenditure of significant family
resources and time to practice religious rituals.
54. In a club good model, a club member’s utility is Ui = U(Si, Ri, Q), where S are normal
goods, R are club goods, and Q reflects the average consumption of club goods by other community
members, or Σi≠jRj/(N−1) for a community of N members. Other conditions include ∂Ui/∂Si,
∂Ui/∂Ri, ∂Ui/∂Q > 0 and U(0, •, •) = U(•, 0, •) = U(•, •, 0) = 0 (Iannaccone 1992; Berman 2000).
The conditions U(•, 0, •) = U(•, •, 0) = 0 mean that a community member will avoid
excommunication from his community at all costs, just as he will strive to avoid poverty and
deprivation of standard goods. Specifically, a diamond thief will derive zero utility from priceless
stolen diamonds if stealing them means he will have to live away from his fellow Orthodox Jews.
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The club good model goes far in explaining the important role of the
ultra-Orthodox in the diamond trade. First, community members’ appetite
for community goods, which by hypothesis are available only in the
community,55 explains why brokers pose no risk of flight. Departure from
the community would reduce a member’s consumption of club goods to zero
and cause a loss in utility that is not overcome by the riches from a stolen
cache of diamonds. Consequently, ultra-Orthodox brokers and cutters are
able to credibly commit to safeguarding a merchant’s diamonds.
Nevertheless, and though it is rare, flight is not unprecedented, and
ultra-Orthodox communities do occasionally watch some members leave
for less observant communities or other ultra-Orthodox sects. Accordingly,
diamond merchants will look for other assurances that suggest a diamond
contractor is fully embedded within the community and thus committed to
cooperation. Ultra-Orthodox community institutions do much of this filtering
themselves. For example, males generally remain full-time students of religious
studies for several years after getting married and beginning families.56 By
the time a male completes full-time study and is ready to assume economic
responsibilities, he already has a spouse and children entrenched within the
community and thus is far less likely to depart. Such entwinement within
the community serves as an additional commitment device.
Another important feature of the club good model is that the whole
community is motivated to ensure that each member engages in desirable
behavior.57 For the ultra-Orthodox, this means the community is invested
in ensuring that its members involved in the diamond industry fulfill their
contractual obligations. The credibility of its members certainly brings wealth
55. It is worth noting that there are many different ultra-Orthodox sects, each with its own
fairly self-contained community. One distinction that separates ultra-Orthodox communities
is the division between the Hasidim (literally, “pious ones”), who emphasize a spiritual and
pietistic observance, and the Misnagdim (literally, “opponents” [of Hasidim]), who emphasize
a stricter legal and academic observance. Other subdivisions further distinguish communities
from each other, including the Lubavitch, Satmar, and Belzer sects of Hasidism. While these
divisions among the ultra-Orthodox have been diluted as the common threats of secularism and
less observant movements of Judaism gained popularity, these distinctions continue to thrive
(Heilman 1992, chap. 2). Consequently, though the world is home to many ultra-Orthodox
communities, the heterogeneity compels community members to remain in their original sects.
56. Berman (2000) discusses the conflicting pressures to commit many years to study
while fulfilling the biblical commandment to “be fruitful and multiply” by marrying young
and having many children. A young couple frequently will live with their in-laws for several
years or will receive community stipends until the male completes his religious study, which
often continues until he is forty years old. Several similar commitment devices signal to community leaders who among their young adults are worthy of economic support.
57. In the formal depiction of the club good model, see note 54 above, the variable
Q—reflecting the average consumption of club goods in the community—is in each member’s
utility function and is constant throughout the community. It thus motivates the entire
community to encourage its members to pursue certain behaviors since each individual’s
consumption affects every community member’s utility. As a consequence, the community
will establish certain norms and institutions that will induce club-good consumption. For the
ultra-Orthodox, this includes contract compliance.
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to the community, ensuring sustained income for its current workers and
its younger members, but it also reflects an adherence to values that have
religious significance to the community and, according to the club good
model, add to each members’ utility.58 Consequently, the community does
not rely on its diamond workers to police themselves and instead employs
community institutions to enforce diamond transactions.59
One community enforcement instrument is to use rabbinical courts to
impose sanctions. The harshest of all punishments is the excommunication
of an offender, which is not unprecedented but which is an extremely severe
and rare penalty.60 Rabbinical courts are more likely to impose less severe
measures, such as stripping an individual of a community honor or an order
to compel an individual to make a charitable contribution to a community
charity. The DDC arbitration committee itself can initiate a proceeding
in a rabbinical court, and the close connection between the two forums
illustrates the diamond industry’s reliance on community institutions to help
enforce contracts.
Less formal institutions also play a role in enforcing contractual
compliance. When the community is familiar with a member’s failure to comply
with contractual obligations, religious leaders often withhold excludable
community goods, such as participation roles in daily prayer, honors in lifecycle ceremonies, access to classes or teachers that are in limited supply, or
enrollment in particularly select educational institutions. Implicit in all these

58. Jewish commandments involving economic behavior are not explained in Jewish legal
texts by norms of efficiency, but instead rest purely on ethical and religious justifications (Baron
1975, 49–54). Consequently, adhering to the Jewish commandment to fulfill contracts, apply
accurate weights and measures (the doctrine of “just price”), or charge only fair prices (the
theory of “misrepresentation”) were akin to fulfilling oaths before the divine.
59. The ultra-Orthodox community uses coordinated sanctions and the denial of
community goods to force other behavior, in addition to certain economic behavior, that state
courts cannot induce. One prominent and controversial example is the plight of the Agunah,
or “chained wife,” the woman who is separated from her husband but has not yet secured a
divorce. According to Jewish law, wives cannot unilaterally divorce their husbands, and previously married women cannot remarry unless their husbands grant them a religious divorce.
Many husbands refuse to grant the religious divorce either to extort concessions from their
wives or simply to spitefully exercise control over their wives’ personal lives. Consequently,
some communities mobilize to compel husbands to grant their wives divorces (Jackson 2001).
Many such compulsions include employing the power of secular courts, but others include
the denial of community honors or synagogue participation and more draconian compulsions such
as physical force and threats of violence. These are the same enforcement mechanisms that
assume economic importance in the diamond industry. For a personal perspective of the plight
of the Agunah and resources for Agunot, see http://www.agunot-campaign.org.uk/index.htm.
60. Bernstein (1992) reports that the DDC arbitration board initiated an excommunication proceeding against Martin Rapaport, the diamond dealer who began the Rapaport
Diamond Report (see note 36 above).
Many ultra-Orthodox communities also bundle religious rights with financial claims, which
prevents a community member from leaving his community with his property. These concerns
make the threat of excommunication all the more powerful. Broyde (1998) describes both how
Jewish law administers the rites of excommunication and argues how secular law should respond.
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specific goods is community respect, which certainly brings an individual direct
utility but which is also expressed through the assorted community rituals.
One significant expression of community respect pertains to how easily—and
with how prominent a family—parents can arrange their children’s marriage.
Arranged marriage is the norm in many ultra-Orthodox communities, and
a family’s community status is often a leading factor in determining with
whom they arrange their children to marry (Heilman 1992, 277–86).
Importantly, Orthodox Judaism is replete with concrete, identifiable
community goods that have subtle hierarchies. Small distinctions can translate into either valued honors or disappointing slights, and the large number
of religious goods offers community leaders a broad menu of punishment
options with an assortment of severity. Community leaders can tailor
punishments to match the severity of the harm done, bringing about the
desired deterrence without expending community resources.
The remarkable features of these community enforcement mechanisms
is not that they work perfectly—no enforcement system is perfect, and the
Orthodox community experiences theft as do all others—but that they are
intimately intertwined with the natural community fabric. Ethical business
behavior is, simply, ethical behavior, and an honorable businessman is an
honorable community member. There appears to be nothing inherently
Jewish about these values, but Jewish law and the community’s system of
disbursing excludable community religious goods has become intimately
enmeshed with the enforcement needs of the business world. Such a combination of institutional complementarities has created a remarkably effective
system. While dealers acknowledge that there have been and will continue
to be merchants who cheat, make mistakes, or somehow deviate from their
contractual obligations, these occurrences are extremely infrequent given the
quantity of transactions and the amount of credit in which merchants engage.
The ultra-Orthodox have managed to institute a remarkably effective system
without measurably adulterating their religious community.61

E. Summary and Implications
To summarize, New York’s diamond merchants can be divided into two
groups. Long-term players enter the industry through family connections and
are induced to cooperate because maintaining a good reputation invites the
promise of inheriting the family business and later bequeathing it to their
descendants. Independent contractors who do not have the prospects of

61. Note that the ultra-Orthodox community punishes its own members even if the victim
is a non-Jew, and more generally, communities in the diamond industry police their own
members even if they cheat outsiders. This is because maintaining the community’s credibility
in dealings with outsiders brings wealth to the whole community (Greif 2004).
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family legacies come overwhelmingly from the ultra-Orthodox community.
They comply with their contractual obligations because failing to do so
would lead to the denial of excludable community goods. This combination
of family-based reputation mechanisms and community-based enforcement
institutions allows New York’s diamond merchants to organize reliable timeinconsistent exchange.
The implications of this two-pronged system of enforcement are that
all players who are trusted with another’s diamonds must belong to one of
the two categories and be subject to its respective punishment devices. The
system embodies what Yoram Ben-Porath (1980) called “the F-Connection,”
whereby trade networks organized around families and friends can execute
informal contracts that enjoy efficiencies unavailable to formal, arm’s-length
transactions. Certainly, the success of the ultra-Orthodox in enforcing
informal contracts mirrors the success of other ethnically homogeneous
communities who have built prosperous networks of commerce without
relying on formal court ordering,62 and some have generalized to construct
a comprehensive theory on the “Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman
Group” (EHMG) (Landa 1981). Leaving tempting generalizations aside, this
article illustrates how family and ethnic networks enable New York’s diamond
industry to prosper despite the ineffectiveness of public courts.

V. RELATED PHENOMENA OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
Since diamond transactions present the same contracting challenges
regardless of the identity of the transacting parties, all diamond centers must
devise mechanisms to enforce those transactions. Similarly, since diamonds
are not the only commodities to present these contracting challenges, trade
networks that successfully traffic diamonds should succeed in other industries
that present similar contracting difficulties. These twin implications present
testable hypotheses. If either a family or a community connection were
required to support diamond credit sales in New York, then similar family
or community institutions (though not necessarily Jewish institutions) would
be present in other diamond centers as well; and if Jewish networks can
enforce diamond credit sales, then they should also excel in enforcing other
transactions that lie beyond the reach of public courts. This section briefly
discusses related instances of private ordering, and though it only offers an
inspection much more cursory than the detailed examination provided above
for New York’s diamond industry, and hopefully future research will provide
more detailed inspections, it finds important—albeit preliminary—support
for the above hypotheses.
62. One prominent and well-studied example is Chinese family businesses in Southeast
Asia (Dewey 1962; Belshaw 1965; Weidenbaum and Hughes 1996).
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A. Mumbai
Indian merchants have recently entered and prospered in New York’s
diamond industry. But, even though they are relative newcomers to New
York’s market, Indian merchants have traded in diamonds for nearly two and
one-half millennia. From the world’s first discovery of diamonds in 800 B.C.
until diamond finds in Brazil in 1844, the Indian subcontinent was the world’s
only source of diamonds. But despite this long history, Indian diamond
merchants did not have a major impact on the global market until the mid1970s. Only then did Indian diamond merchants translate their diamond
expertise into major cutting operations that, one decade later, developed into
lucrative global trading networks.63 Now, Mumbai is home to an active bourse,
and thousands of cutting factories populate nearby Gujarat province.64 Over
700,000 Indians work as diamond cutters, polishing nine out of every ten
stones sold in the world (Oppenheimer 1999; Kripalani 2000).65
Like their Jewish counterparts, Indian diamond merchants rely on both
family and community connections to support their trading networks (Dotson
and Dotson 1968). Family networks are evident in each Indian company,
and Indian family businesses stretch from Mumbai into the world’s other
cutting and distribution centers (Piramal 1990).66 And because a small ethnic
minority has dominated India’s diamond industry, community and tribal foundations are equally prominent. For centuries, the Jains of Palanpur, a religious
minority from a parched, dusty village in Northern Gujarat,67 have served
as India’s diamontaires. Today, over 95 percent of the 2,400 members of India’s
Gem and Jewelry Export Promotion Council and the leaders of all seven of
the nation’s largest companies, which control 25 percent of the country’s
diamond exports, are Palanpuri Jain.
In addition to the Palanpuris, a second ethnic sect is active in the
diamond industry. Angadias, which in Gujarati means “one who carries
63. In recounting the early growth of India’s diamond industry and the establishment
of large cutting operations specializing in small stones, Bharat Shah, founder and chairman
of India’s largest private empire (and a multibillionaire), boasted “We went to the bottom
end of the market, buying and cutting diamonds which the Jews had rejected” (Piramal 1996).
64. Diamond cutting factories can employ workers outside family and community
networks, and thus transfer to low-wage countries, because a firm’s hierarchical controls are
able to govern diamond transactions within the factory (Richman 2004; Williamson 1985).
Historically, diamond merchants have profitably moved diamond cutting ventures away from
diamond centers and to countries as diverse as China, Brazil, and Cuba while successfully
managing the dangers of employee theft (Federman 1985).
65. Note that this statistic reflects the number of stones cut, not the market share value
they represent (which is substantially less than 90 percent). Also, this figure further overstates
the role of India’s cutting since some stones are polished several times in different locations.
66. One diamond merchant lamented, “This business demands personal attention and
trust. Only your family can give both. I have remained a small diamond exporter because I
do not have a brother whom I can send to live in Antwerp” (Piramal 1990).
67. Jainism, a religious and philosophical tradition that is close to (and perhaps has rise
to) Buddhism, accounts for 0.4 percent of all Indians. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jainism.
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valuables” or “trustworthy person,” serve the important role of transporting
diamonds from the Mumbai to Gujarat for cutting. Angadias are recruited
only from the Patel community in Gujarat’s Mehsana district and have
traveled the Mumbai-Gujarat route for more than 125 years, beginning with
camel caravans and now traveling third-class on express trains (Hazarika
1985).68 Like the ultra-Orthodox, both Angadias and the Palanpuris are
described as very tightly knit, secretive, and insular communities (Hazarika
1985; Karp 1999; Kriplani 2000),69 and like the ultra-Orthodox, both
communities have harnessed their community structure to excel in diamond
centers (Piramal 1990; 1996).
The structure of the Indian diamond networks provides useful
corroborating evidence that community institutions are responsible for
success in the diamond industry. Indian and Jewish merchants have both
achieved prominence through similar mechanisms—family businesses and
ethnic networks—but have done so on different continents and with separate
histories. Moreover, both communities have maintained their networks
despite recent vigorous competition with each other. In the face of global
competition, these traditional community structures have proven to be
economic assets, not historical vestiges.

B. Antwerp
Diamond merchants began importing diamonds to Antwerp in the
late fourteenth century, and Antwerp’s leadership in diamonds came in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when Jewish cutters were expelled from
Spain and Portugal and fled to Antwerp and Amsterdam. It has been a global
diamond capital since 1870, when Belgium’s colonial roots enabled the
country’s merchants to take advantage of lucrative diamonds discoveries in
South Africa, and today’s Antwerp and its four interconnected bourses
are the first stop for most uncut diamonds. Eight out of ten of the world’s
uncut diamonds and one in two polished diamonds pass through Antwerp,
generating $36 billion in exports in 2004 (Fullerton 2005).
Of all the world’s diamond centers, Antwerp most closely resembles New
York. The city’s diamond trade is dominated by approximately 1,600 familybased companies whose members largely belong to three distinct ethnic groups:
native Belgian, Jewish, and Indian. The Indian traders, nearly all Palanpuri
Jain, are relatively recent arrivals, but their family and ethnic networks now
constitute approximately two-thirds of Antwerp’s diamond trade. Jewish and
68. A typical troupe of thirty Anagadias—plainly dressed, unarmed, and carrying
unmarked canvas sacks—will transport $4 million in diamonds each day while earning salaries
of less than $50 a month.
69. One courier was noted, “Anagadias like me will bring only persons that we know
into the business because our personal honor and career is at stake” (Karp 1999).
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Belgian family businesses, both still important players, have longer histories
in the country, with many Belgian families tracing their roots to the original
traders in Bruges, and have relied on intergenerational legacies to sustain
their diamond businesses.
Also like New York’s trade, Antwerp’s brokers and cutters historically have
been predominantly ultra-Orthodox Jews. In the beginning of the twentieth
century, Jews constituted three-quarters of the city’s diamond brokers and
an even higher percentage of the factory owners, and the city’s large ultraOrthodox Jewish population led Antwerp to be known as the “Jerusalem of
the West” (Abicht 2000).70 Today, cutting factories in India, enjoying cheaper
labor costs, have supplanted most of the cutting in Antwerp, and the city
has seen its peak of 30,000 cutters fall to just 800 specialized polishers. These
changes have also led Indians to constitute a majority of the Antwerp
market (Simons 2006). Nonetheless, Antwerp remains an important diamond
center, and despite its significant changes, the city continues to rest on intergenerational family businesses and a large presence of ethnic brokers.

C. Israel/Palestine
Israel’s cottage diamond industry experienced its first significant growth
during World War II, when Palestine became a refuge for Jewish diamond
merchants during the German occupation of the Netherlands and Belgium.
Israel’s diamond industry suffered briefly during the years leading up to its
War of Independence in 1948 (which, in part, helped Antwerp regain its
prominence after World War II) but again experienced rapid growth in the
1950s and became the world’s largest exporter in the early 1980s.
Israel’s current diamond industry has many of the same features present
in the other diamond centers, particularly New York. Diamond companies
are family-based companies, and Israel’s diamond bourse, the Israel Diamond
Exchange, will now only admit new members who are relatives of current
members. Also like New York, many ultra-Orthodox occupy the Diamond
Exchange, serving as brokers for large diamond merchants, and between
30–40 percent of all Exchange members are ultra-Orthodox. Here too, family
relationships and the ultra-Orthodox community are both important
components in operating the industry.
The development of Israel’s diamond cutting industry, however, reveals
a slightly different institutional picture than those in other centers. Israel’s
early industry grew on refugees and immigrants who started with jobs in small
cutting facilities; after these new arrivals acquired industry knowledge and
skills, they opened their own small operations with a small collection of newer
70. For a nice, and not entirely obsolete, discussion of Antwerp’s Jewish community, and
its involvement with the diamond industry, see Gutwirth (1968).
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immigrants. Thus, unlike Israel’s current industry and unlike conditions in other
centers, Israel’s early growth offered opportunities for entry. This appears to
be a small exception to the requirement of a family or community connection.
It is tempting to discount the brief period of entry to extenuating
circumstances. During Israel’s early years, the industry was growing rapidly
and was in desperate need for new labor to support a promising industry in
an otherwise struggling economy. Also, Israel was home to thousands of World
War II refugees who were desperate for work, and several Israeli government
agencies actively searched for new sources of diamonds to buttress the
country’s emerging polishing trade. But since economic desperation might
exacerbate, not reduce, diamond contracting challenges, a better explanation
probably lies in Israel’s unusual historical context in its early years. Many
diamond workers were World War II refugees who posed only the remotest
risk of fleeing the country and, especially in the small and intimate nation,
would have trouble hiding. Moreover, the aftermath of the Holocaust possibly
created a strong, pan-national spirit that could have advanced both trustbased relationships and social enforcement mechanisms. Even so, the leap
from family and community relationships to broader national connections
is a difficult one to make. To be sure, the early days of the State of Israel
were unique, and the nation’s diamond industry during those years appears
to be a narrow exception to the family-community hypothesis.

D. Jewish Merchants and Private Ordering
The same family and community networks that benefit Jewish merchants
in the diamond trade should also provide a comparative advantage in other
industries in which contracts lie beyond the enforcement of public courts.
Jewish economic history offers several instances that support this implication.
Before modernity introduced reliable court-enforced contract law, Jewish
merchants historically traded in small, portable, and valuable commodities,
including money. In the Middle Ages, Jews were prominent in the trade for
expensive dye-stuffs, such as reseda, saffron, and indigo (Baron 1975, 162–63).
Jewish craftsmen also excelled working in fine metals, and Jewish goldsmiths
found success in twelfth century Egypt, Iraq, Persia, Yemen, and Maghreb,
fifteenth century Spain and Portugal, and seventeenth century Central Europe
(Baron 1975, 164–65).71 But above all other commercial activity, pre-Enlightenment Jewish businessmen engaged in banking and money lending.72 Jewish
bankers emerged in Baghdad in the ninth century because they were able to
71. Baron (1975), consistent with the views expressed in notes 6–7 above, offers: “That
this was a widespread Jewish occupation in Muslim countries may be explained by the contempt
in which artisans were held by the Arabs.”
72. Cecil Roth (1961b) writes, “The Jew was the classic money-lender of the Middle
Ages, and the classic profession of the medieval Jew was money-lending.”
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collect and invest the savings of the whole Jewish merchant class (as opposed
to the savings of a few rich individuals, which at that time was a far more
common banking practice). Europe saw its first Jewish bankers within the
administration of the Merovingian Kings in AD 481, and for the five centuries
following the rise of the First Crusade, Jews turned chiefly to loan-banking
for sustenance (Emery 1959; Roth 1961b; Arkin 1975, 57–63).
For small portable goods of such high value, credit sales are extremely
vulnerable to nonpayment, so the successful merchants were those who could
consistently collect payment (and similarly, those who could credibly commit
to pay). Since the social structure of the Jewish community before the
Enlightenment in the eighteenth century was insular, intimate, and fostered
interdependency—very similar to today’s ultra-Orthodox community—it
is likely that community institutions and norms were critical in governing
these trades.
Family and community networks can also offer lucrative opportunities
in modern markets in addition to the diamond trade. One such opportunity
is trade in illegal goods, since sales contracts for illegally traded goods are
not enforceable in public courts. And, in fact, several Jewish diamond
merchants have employed their community institutions to profit from
illegal goods. In 1999, for example, Russian authorities apprehended several
ultra-Orthodox Jews for illegally smuggling assorted goods from the country,
including diamonds and antique Hebrew books (JTA 1999). More dramatic,
the New York Daily News reported that Israeli drug dealers harnessed Jewish
diamond networks to smuggle Ecstasy into New York, where ultra-Orthodox
couriers typically transported 30,000 to 45,000 pills and as much as $500,000
in drug proceeds (Katz 2001, 89–91).
Jewish merchants would not have found success in these other trades had
they been unable to enforce executory contracts that lay beyond the public
courts. The sources of success for modern-day Jewish diamond traders mirror
the sources of success for these other Jewish merchants throughout history.

VI. CONCLUSION
Jewish predominance in the diamond industry is explained by the
community’s ability to enforce contracts that are unenforceable for other
merchants. Intergenerational family firms enable reputation mechanisms to
enforce cooperation among long-term dealers, and intimate community institutions police the behavior of short-term, independent players. The result
is a system of reliable contractual enforcement that permits sales on credit
and leads to a rejection of public courts. Community institutions are central
in explaining both the industry’s infrastructure and the industry’s leaders.
The particularly interesting feature of this system is the economic role
of ultra-Orthodox Jews. The ultra-Orthodox provide critical value-added
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services that add significant efficiency to the system of exchange. They work
as skilled diamond cutters whose polishing increases the sale prices of stones,
and they play the essential role of middlemen brokers who match certain
stones with the buyers who most value them. Their unique credibility provides
the Jewish merchants with a comparative advantage over rival merchant groups
that lack such community foundations, and their role identifies limitations
to public contract enforcement that persist even in developed economies.
When courts fail, community institutions can arise to fill their place.73
However, the end of the ultra-Orthodox’s role in the diamond trade
may be at hand, as two recent developments may irreversibly change the
diamond industry and obviate the contributions the ultra-Orthodox make.
The first is the utilization of low-cost labor to cut and polish diamonds. Prior
to the explosion of Indian cutting factories, diamonds were chiefly polished
in Antwerp, New York, and Israel by family businesses and independent
cutters. Now, while cutters in those diamond centers still polish many of the
largest and most valuable stones, small stones, which comprise a vast majority
of cutting activity, are polished in large factories in India and Southeast Asia.
Antwerp’s and Israel’s cutters are now a fraction of their former glory—over
the last two decades, Antwerp has lost nearly 90 percent of its cutting jobs and
Israel approximately 70 percent. Indian and Chinese laborers are assuming
the positions long held by the ultra-Orthodox, and technological innovations,
mostly in the form of cutting machinery that replaces skilled labor, will
accelerate that trend.
A second development is De Beers’ new marketing strategy. In July 2000,
De Beers, facing a decline in its market share and a corresponding dilution
of its monopoly rents, announced plans to brand its diamonds and market
them directly to consumers with a promise that each diamond has identical
qualities. A cornerstone of the company’s plan was forming a joint venture
in early 2001 with LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton, a French luxury
goods conglomerate, to market “designer diamonds” that exhibit unusual
shapes and designs. In addition, De Beers is requiring its sightholders to devise
similar strategic plans to market brand diamonds to high-end consumers
(Weber 2001).74 If these marketing strategies work, then consumers will be
able to purchase a diamond like any other commodity and will bypass the
entire search process in which brokers match buyers with specific stones.
Similar strategies are being pursued by some Internet diamond brokerages.
Web sites list an inventory of diamonds with GIA-certified features and a
high-resolution picture, and interested buyers negotiate directly with owners
without intervening middlemen. Even though many merchants remain

73. For a more formal model predicting when the limitations of public courts will induce
merchants to pursue private ordering, see Richman (2004).
74. Some designer diamonds have already emerged, such as the Escada Diamond with
97 facets (the traditional diamond has only 58) and the patented Leo Diamond with 66 facets.
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skeptical that a picture and GIA categories can relay sufficient information
about a stone, Internet sales are growing and by one statistic already comprise
15 percent of all sales in the United States (Berger 2001).75
The diamond industry is now changing rapidly, and many innovative
efforts scheme to skip over the proverbial middleman, which has been the
very source of the ultra-Orthodox Jews’ comparative advantage. The ultimate
success of new cutting ventures and marketing strategies—and with them,
the future role of the ultra-Orthodox—may be known soon. The next decade
could mark an important turning point in the 1,000-year history of Jews in
the diamond trade.
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